The impact of ESMA regulatory identifiers on the quality of ratings by Klusak, Patrycja et al.
Accepted Manuscript
The impact of ESMA regulatory identifiers on the quality of
ratings
Patrycja Klusak, Rasha Alsakka, Owain ap Gwilym
PII: S1057-5219(18)30779-8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2019.06.004
Reference: FINANA 1365
To appear in: International Review of Financial Analysis
Received date: 29 November 2018
Revised date: 11 April 2019
Accepted date: 7 June 2019
Please cite this article as: P. Klusak, R. Alsakka and O.a. Gwilym, The impact of ESMA
regulatory identifiers on the quality of ratings, International Review of Financial Analysis,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2019.06.004
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As
a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The
manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before
it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may
be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the
journal pertain.
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
 
The impact of ESMA regulatory identifiers on the quality of ratings 
Patrycja Klusak
 a
, Rasha Alsakka
b,
*, Owain ap Gwilym
b
,  
a
 Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, NR4 7TJ, UK.
 
b 
Bangor Business School, Bangor University, LL57 2DG, UK 
 
 
This version: 11
th
 April 2019 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of the introduction of ESMA credit rating identifiers on the 
quality of ratings. These identifiers form part of the disclosure requirements placed upon 
credit rating agencies (CRAs) since 2012 under a new EU regulatory regime and have not 
featured in any prior empirical literature. Rating informativeness is gauged from bond market 
data. Using a rich dataset of sovereign rating actions by the three major CRAs for 70 
countries during the period 2006-2016, we find that the ESMA requirement for identifiers 
yields varying outcomes across downgrades and upgrades. The rating quality associated with 
downgrades by Moody’s improves, whereas upgrades by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch are of 
lower quality. These results are consistent with greater conservatism in rating policies after 
the regulatory reforms. ESMA’s additional focus on analyst location does not reveal any 
consistent difference in the quality of ratings. 
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1. Introduction  
      A growing body of literature investigates US regulatory reforms relating to credit rating 
agencies (CRAs) and the effects of these changes on rating quality (e.g. Behr et al., 2018). 
Rating quality is important for international financial stability, because ratings are strongly 
embedded in many banking and investment regulations and therefore affect the welfare of 
both borrowers and investors (e.g. Bae et al., 2015). We focus on a unique European 
regulatory aspect which does not arise in the US regime. In 2012, the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) introduced new regulations, stipulating that credit ratings 
must be accompanied by identifiers distinguishing between ratings issued by analysts within 
the EU, versus those issued in countries that qualify as endorsed jurisdictions. For the ratings 
to be classed as ‘endorsed’, the analyst must be located in a jurisdiction which has a 
comparably stringent regulatory regime to that of the EU (EC, 2011). Further, only ratings 
accompanied by these identifiers can be used for regulatory purposes after April 2012.
1
 
      ESMA (2011a) anticipates that using identifiers should assist in dissemination of 
information amongst investors and support supervisory integration of CRAs. This in turn 
should benefit the functioning of financial markets and their stability, and protect EU 
investors through equivalence in the quality of ratings across countries. A strict legal and 
supervisory framework aims “to ensure that ratings are independent, objective, and of 
adequate quality” in order to underpin the confidence of financial markets and investors 
(ESMA, 2017b). ESMA’s belief is that compliance with these rules will have improved the 
quality of ratings used within Europe. To date, there is no published evidence on this. We 
assess the impact of these identifier rules on the quality of ratings, using a dataset of 
sovereign ratings assigned by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch for 70 countries from 2006-2016.  
                                                 
1
 ESMA (2017a) state that more than two thirds of the ratings used for regulatory purposes in Europe are 
‘endorsed’. 
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     It is an open question whether the introduction of rating identifiers could have any 
consistent or meaningful impact on rating quality. It is important to investigate such a 
substantial policy initiative, especially with no prior evidence being available on this 
question. We also specifically examine whether the location of rating analysts (in the EU 
versus outside the EU) has any significant impact on changes in rating quality. Investigation 
of the effects of ESMA’s endorsement rules is important because such rules could potentially 
signal enhanced credibility of CRAs’ opinions. Studying the impact of these rules informs 
future policies and regulations and identifies whether their effect is contradictory or 
unanticipated.  
 Furthermore,
 
our paper utilizes sovereign ratings, offering a significant contribution to the 
literature because the quality of sovereign ratings is highly important for practitioners and 
governments alike. Sovereign ratings have greater impact and influence in comparison with 
the corporate and structured ratings investigated by some recent literature on CRA regulation 
(e.g. Bae et al., 2015; Behr et al., 2018; Bolton et al., 2012; Dimitrov et al., 2015; Flynn and 
Ghent, 2018; Hill et al., 2018). Sovereign ratings reflect a country’s willingness and ability to 
pay its obligations (e.g. Baum et al., 2016; Cai et al., 2019). They directly affect a country’s 
cost of borrowing and foreign direct investment flows (e.g. Cai et al., 2019), and indirectly 
affect the cost of firms’ credit via the sovereign ceiling on bank and corporate ratings 
(Almeida at al., 2017; Arezki et al., 2011; Borensztein et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016). The 
recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe has emphasized the consequences of spillovers of 
sovereign rating actions across countries and asset classes (e.g. Baum et al., 2016; Hill et al., 
2018), which further strengthens the importance of this study.   
       The existing empirical evidence on the effects of regulation on CRAs considers non-
sovereign ratings and takes the perspective of changing competition between CRAs (Bae et 
al., 2015; Behr et al., 2018). We offer a different approach focusing on the direct effect of 
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5 
regulation on rating quality, more in line with a theoretical paper by Opp et al. (2013). 
Although sovereign ratings represent the highest proportion of the total outstanding ratings 
across all rating segments, the competition level between CRAs for sovereign ratings is the 
lowest across these segments (ESMA, 2016).  
     Most previous studies assessing the impact of regulatory initiatives on the quality of 
ratings focus on US regulations (see Behr et al., 2018; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Dimitrov et al., 
2015; Doherty et al., 2012). In addition, most prior research addresses time periods before the 
EU regulatory regime was introduced.
 
For instance, Behr et al. (2018) use a data sample 
between 1973 and 1982, Bongaerts et al. (2012) utilize a sample for 2002 to 2008, and 
Doherty et al.’s (2012) sample is from1989 to 2000. Becker and Milbourn (2011) apply a 
sample from 1995 to 2006 whereas Kisgen and Strahan (2010) use the period between 2001 
and 2005. Moreover, our paper examines the direct feedback of regulatory authorization on 
ratings quality in contrast with previous studies assessing the price impact of regulation (e.g. 
Kisgen and Strahan, 2010).  
     Attaining information and measuring creditworthiness is costly and time consuming for 
investors, therefore many entrust this task to the CRAs. According to Becker and Milbourn 
(2011), inter alia the quality of ratings rests on their ability to communicate information to 
market participants by maintaining a stable meaning of risk classification. Low quality 
ratings might harm the information diffusion of ratings unless all market participants are well 
informed. If investors are not able to extract reliable information from ratings, this lessens 
their value and reduces the benefits for the financial system (Bolton et al., 2012). 
Additionally, low quality ratings complicate regulations and make contracting with ratings 
more difficult. Finally, ratings quality is at the centre of the policy agenda because it is 
closely related to banking regulation (capital adequacy requirements in particular). 
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    In this study, following Bae et al. (2015), Becker and Milbourn (2011), Behr et al. 
(2018) and Dimitrov et al. (2015), the quality of ratings is captured by the information 
content which surfaces through the ability of ratings to explain bond yields. The market 
functions more effectively when ratings are more aligned with bond yields. For instance, 
when ratings accurately reflect the risk of an issuer, and therefore correlate highly with its 
bond yields, they have the power to protect investors by reducing information asymmetries 
(Flynn and Ghent, 2018). Therefore, our research questions are: (i) Does the quality of 
ratings (captured by their informativeness) change after the introduction of ESMA 
identifiers?, and (ii)   Does the location of rating analysts (in the EU versus outside the EU) 
have an impact on any changes in the quality of ratings? 
    To preview the findings, ESMA’s identifier disclosure rules have not fully succeeded in 
achieving the aim of improved quality of ratings. There are differences in the quality of 
ratings in the period after the endorsement regime was introduced. We find poorer rating 
quality (less informative ratings) for positive rating actions by all CRAs after the introduction 
of the identifiers, while better quality (more informative) ratings are reported for Moody’s 
negative actions. However, there are mixed findings on the impact of the specific location of 
rating analysts on the informativeness of sovereign ratings. This outcome is not unexpected 
because ratings should only reflect factors related to the expected debt servicing by the issuer, 
and not to be strongly affected by the location of rating analysts. Specifically, there is limited 
evidence that positive events by Fitch and Moody’s are less informative when the relevant 
analysts are located outside the EU (with EE identifiers), whereas S&P positive events are of 
lower quality when their rating analysts are based in the EU. In contrast, there is some 
evidence of better quality ratings for Fitch negative events when their analysts are located 
outside the EU.  
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 Such differences across CRAs are consistent with the unequal market impacts of rating 
signals by different CRAs reported in previous literature (Afonso et al., 2012; Arezki et al., 
2011; Baum et al., 2016; Bedendo et al., 2018; Livingston et al., 2010). Our results, to a large 
extent, support those of Behr et al. (2018) and Dimitrov et al. (2015), in terms of unintended 
consequences of CRA regulation in the US, and are in line with the theoretical predictions of 
Opp et al. (2013). 
    Despite many studies of CRA regulations (e.g. Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Behr et al., 
2018; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Dimitrov et al., 2015), no previous study has investigated the 
impact of ESMA rating identifiers and the location of rating analysts on rating quality. This 
paper is therefore able to offer many important contributions to the literature. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the background of the 
EU CRA regulatory regime along with a summary of the relevant academic literature. Section 
4 presents the data and descriptive statistics then Section 5 describes the methodology. 
Section 6 reports empirical results and Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
 
2. Regulatory developments 
2.1. European CRA regulation 
 EU CRA regulatory initiatives aim at reducing conflicts of interest, overreliance on ratings 
and spillover effects, while increasing independence and soundness of rating processes and 
improving quality of rating methodologies and ratings (ECB, 2012). ESMA believe that 
endorsing ratings from non-EU countries enables supervisory integration of the CRAs. 
Greater co-operation between outside supervisors benefits the functioning of financial 
markets and protects investors in the EU (ESMA, 2011a). According to the EC, a CRA 
operating in a non-EU country needs to conform to the EU level of supervisory expectations. 
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The usage of rating identifiers differentiates between ratings assigned inside/outside the EU. 
The regulators try to ensure that, in the current framework, “users of ratings in the EU would 
benefit from equivalent protections in terms of a CRA’s integrity, transparency, good 
governance and reliability” (ESMA, 2017a). The recent financial crisis showed that there is a 
need for stronger and more stable markets and for investor protection that is transferable 
across states (ESMA, 2012). When assessing the equivalence of non-EU countries, the rules 
incorporate all provisions of the EU CRA Regulation.
2 
The equivalence in quality of ratings 
and methodologies (supported by the identifiers) should help to protect financial market 
stability. High quality ratings lead to improved efficiency of capital markets and improve 
transparency and competition (ESMA, 2011b).  
 In seeking to influence the quality of ratings, ESMA requires CRAs to be registered as a 
regulated CRA in the EU to be able to endorse ratings (into the EU) which are originated 
outside the EU. Initially, the equivalence regime required endorsed ratings to be assigned in a 
jurisdiction which operates a regulatory regime for CRAs which is “at least as stringent as the 
relevant EU rules” (EC, 2011). The endorsement permits CRAs which operate and are 
registered in the EU to authorize ratings of entities which are part of their own groups and 
which operate outside the EU. Both the ratings assigned in the EU as well as ratings from 
non-EU countries but endorsed based on the equivalence regime can be used for regulatory 
purposes (e.g., by banks).
3
 
 ESMA (2017b) provides an update of the initial Guidelines on Endorsement, which are a 
reflection of issues arising with the regime. It provides an updated methodological framework 
                                                 
2
 These include: (i) extent of regulatory and supervisory framework; (ii) corporate governance; (iii) 
conflict of interest; (iv) organizational constraints; (v) quality of methodologies and ratings; (vi) disclosure 
rules; (vii) supervision and enforcement rules. 
3
 The equivalence tests conducted by ESMA, announced before end-April 2012, concluded that ratings 
originating from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Singapore and the 
United States fulfil this requirement. After that date, market participants in the EU (e.g., banks calculating 
capital adequacy positions) were forbidden from using ratings originating from unrecognized jurisdictions 
for regulatory purposes (ESMA, 2012). 
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9 
to evaluate the non-EU countries’ legal and regulatory frameworks. The main changes relate 
to obligations of the endorsing CRA, ESMA’s supervisory powers and objective reasons for 
using endorsed ratings. From 2018, the responsibility for ensuring that a CRA’s internal 
operations in a non-EU country are as stringent as those outlined by EU requirements lies 
with the endorsing CRA. It is no longer the case that the rating issued in the country meeting 
equivalence tests (e.g., Argentina) automatically meets this criterion. In addition, “ESMA 
clarifies that it has the power to request periodical information directly from the endorsing 
EU CRA regarding endorsed credit ratings and the conduct of the third country CRA”.  
 
2.2. US versus EU regulatory reforms 
One could be concerned about a possibility that the changes in quality of ratings, attributed 
to ESMA identifiers, might be influenced by elements of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) which 
affect CRAs in the US from July 2010. In this section, we discuss the differences between the 
US and EU regulatory regimes for CRAs, to further strengthen the motivation of this study. 
Importantly, the DFA does not make any reference to the location of analysts. The section of 
the DFA relating to CRA analysts only considers the knowledge and qualification standards 
that the analysts are required to meet, e.g. training, experience, and competence for the rating 
segment (Dodd-Frank Act 936, 2010).
 
 
Although the rules aiming at CRAs in Europe and the US are similar, the European 
regulation is more pronounced with respect to sovereign ratings. CRAs were accused of 
worsening the European debt crisis by downgrading the ratings of Eurozone sovereigns too 
far and too fast. EU regulations aim for increased transparency and completeness of 
sovereign rating methodologies, and to address the timing of rating actions. For example, 
sovereign debt ratings are to be assessed every six months and with detailed explanations for 
the rationale behind the rating actions. The CRAs are permitted to issue unsolicited ratings 
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10 
for sovereigns up to three times per year with their timing specified in advance. Sovereign 
ratings are required to be published after the close of business (Friday) and minimum one 
hour before markets open again (Monday) (OJEU, 2013). US regulation does not require 
CRAs to announce when releasing sovereign ratings and there is no provision requesting their 
solicitation status (ESMA, 2017c). As of May 2013, CRAs in the EU are forbidden from 
making policy recommendations, prescriptions or guidelines when releasing sovereign ratings 
and/or outlooks (OJEU, 2013). Another difference between the two regimes is the effort 
towards tackling overreliance on ratings by market participants, which is attributed to strong 
hardwiring of CRA actions in investment rules and regulations (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). 
US regulators took significant steps to decrease reference to ratings (Bedendo et al., 2018). 
Although the BIS (2014) proposal to revise the standardised approach for credit risk aimed to 
erase the references to external credit ratings, it later restored and allowed the use of external 
ratings in Basel III post-crisis regulatory reforms (BIS, 2017).  
Another area of major differences between the two regimes involves quality of 
methodologies and of credit ratings (ESMA, 2017c). For instance, the US framework does 
not require CRAs to provide the credit rating information to the rated entity prior to 
publication in order to identify possible errors, but this is a requirement in Europe. 
Additional differences can be found with respect to disclosure rules (ESMA, 2017c). US 
regulation does not require the solicitation status of the rating released to be identified, which 
is the case in European regulation. Moreover, the EU (not the US) regulation requires CRAs 
to disclose, on their websites and to the supervisor, information about all entities or debt 
instruments submitted for their initial review or preliminary rating. Furthermore, CRAs in the 
EU (not in the US) are required to provide details of rating fees.  
The above comparison of the regulatory rules provides confidence that the ESMA 
identifiers introduced in 2012 were not foreseen/captured by changes in the US regulation. 
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3. Relevant credit rating literature 
 Although credit ratings play a vital role in financial markets and the literature on credit 
ratings is voluminous, research which specifically investigates ratings quality is surprisingly 
limited. The majority of closely related prior studies concentrate on the information content 
of ratings, which is approached by considering the association between credit ratings (or their 
changes) and bond yields (or their changes). Becker and Milbourn (2011) define the quality 
of ratings as their ability to transmit reliable information to market participants and their 
ability to categorize the risk of a rated instrument. Classification is especially important for 
regulation due to its requirement for stable interpretations of ratings used in contracts and 
capital requirements. In other papers, the concept of rating accuracy is used. For example, 
Flynn and Ghent (2018) measure rating quality as the gap between the level of ratings of 
entrant versus incumbent CRAs. 
 Other studies focus on the effect of ratings on the supply of debt capital with the use of 
leverage as a dependent variable. Kisgen and Strahan (2010) investigate the regulatory 
influence of various levels of ratings, rather than the impact of having a rating, on bond 
yields. The authors establish that rating-contingent regulation influences a firm’s cost of debt 
capital (bond yields) asymmetrically. Only higher ratings from a newly certified CRA 
correspond to a decline in firms’ cost of capital. These results are corroborated by Bongaerts 
et al. (2012), who state that Fitch’s ratings are important mainly for regulatory reasons as a 
tie-breaker between differing ratings of Moody’s and S&P.  
  The impact of regulation on the rating industry is mainly examined by considering the 
entry of a regulated CRA and the corresponding effect of increased competition on the rest of 
the CRA industry. Bolton et al. (2012) and Dimitrov et al. (2015) suggest that the overall 
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quality of ratings drops with increased competition. Bolton et al. (2012) conclude that 
increased competition between CRAs might lead to increased rating shopping and a 
consequent reduced wealth effect. Studying the entry of new CRAs into structured ratings, 
Flynn and Ghent (2018) find that entrant CRAs issue higher ratings than the incumbent firms, 
a strategy used to win business. This results in rating shopping on the part of issuers.  
 Behr et al. (2018) suggest that the restricted competition and increased importance of 
ratings due to their hardwiring in banking and investment regulations can have a detrimental 
effect on rating quality. The authors find that SEC regulation from 1975 increased the 
barriers to entry and captured a customer base for certified CRAs, which changed their 
incentives and created a tendency towards inflated bond ratings. In contrast, Doherty et al. 
(2012) study insurance ratings and find that the new entrant CRA chooses higher standards 
than the incumbent companies. They conclude that increased competition results in improved 
precision of default rate estimates. Similarly, Bae et al. (2015) cast doubt on the view that 
competition leads to inflated ratings in the corporate bond market. By revisiting the study of 
Becker and Milbourn (2011), these authors find that their results of rating inflation suffer 
from endogeneity caused by unobservable industry effects.  
 There is only very scarce literature on the effect of CRA regulation, which does not 
primarily emphasise a competition perspective. A theoretical paper by Opp et al. (2013) 
suggests that ratings-contingent regulation diminishes the incentives of CRAs in information 
provision. Opp et al. (2013) argue that there is known to exist a threshold level of regulatory 
gain, beyond which the regulatory arbitrage brings in the same advantage as delegated 
information attainment by the CRA. When issuers receive favourable rating treatment and its 
economic advantage is higher than that of obtaining information, regulation causes the 
collapse of the information provision process and leads to ratings inflation. They suggest that 
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it might be cost-effective for CRAs to release lower-quality ratings instead of dealing with 
complicated asset structures (e.g. for banks).  
 
4. Data
4
 
4.1. Data sources 
 The bond characteristics and pricing data are collected from Bloomberg L.P. The selection 
criteria include publicly placed, unsecured, straight sovereign bonds with fixed coupon, 
remaining maturity between 1 to 30 years and issued in US dollars. We exclude structured 
notes, inflation-linked notes, hybrid or dual-currency bonds and restructured debt. Only 
bonds with the pricing information available (historical data such as YTM) are retained. We 
match rating events with the adequate bond spread information and investigate any outliers.
5
 
The dataset comprises 823 rating events
6
 assigned by three CRAs for 70 sovereigns.
7
 
     Bond spreads, in basis points, are calculated by taking the difference between the yield to 
maturity of the sovereign bond subject to the rating action and the yield to maturity of the 
comparable US benchmark bond.  We match each sovereign bond with the benchmark bond 
based on the closest remaining maturity and coupon amount. The 70 sovereigns are 
represented by 159 individual sovereign bonds. We use 76 US bonds as benchmarks for 
spread calculations. The long-term foreign-currency ratings are gathered from the three 
CRAs’ publications. The rating actions are matched with the bond data. Data for multiple 
bonds is normally observable on the day of the rating action. We select the bond with the 
                                                 
4 
We discuss Data prior to Methodology in order to explain and define variables and data issues that will be 
required in the methodology.    
5
 Outliers in sub-samples are identified using the MM-robust regression method and are excluded before 
estimation. The rule applied here is that robust standardized residuals (vertical dimension outlier) which lie 
outside the range [-20, +20] and [0, 20] of the robust distance of the distribution (horizontal dimension 
outlier) are excluded from the analysis. As a result, 5% of the data sample was discarded.  
6 
Because we use US Treasury bonds as a benchmark for the sovereign credit spread, we exclude the few 
rating events for the US within the sample period. 
7  
The starting sample includes sovereign ratings for 91 countries, and then is reduced to 70 countries on 
the basis of bond data availability. These 70 countries reflect large developed and emerging countries.  
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highest issue amount per sovereign on the particular rating event date. For any given rating 
event, only one bond is considered.  
4.1.1. Descriptive statistics 
   We identify rating events using a comprehensive credit rating scale (58-CCR point) 
which includes ratings, watch and outlook status, as follows: AAA = 58, AA+ = 55 … CCC- 
= 4, C/SD/CC/D = 1. Then, for positive watch (outlook) we add +2 (+1) whereas for negative 
watch (outlook) we subtract 2 (1), respectively (see Appendix A). Table 1 presents statistics 
on the credit events in our sample. Overall, actions of one CCR point constitute the largest 
share among all CRAs (exceeding 22% and 19% for positive and negative events 
respectively). There are 152 (194), 141 (104) and 116 (116) upgrades (downgrades) by S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch respectively. The highest average numerical rating, based on the 58-CCR 
numerical rating scale, is by Fitch (29, equivalent to BB+/BBB-), followed by Moody’s (28, 
BB+) and S&P (27, BB/BB+). S&P releases the highest proportion of downgrades against 
upgrades in all time periods.
8
 The implication that S&P is the more conservative CRA 
corresponds with prior literature (e.g., Flynn and Ghent, 2018). S&P assigned the highest 
proportion of 2 and above CCR-point downgrades (16%). Fitch has the highest proportion 
(12%) of positive actions by more than 2 CCR points.  
   We also split the sample into the pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier 
(May 2012-June 2016) periods. From the total of 823 events, 426 (397) actions occur in the 
pre-identifier (post-identifier) period. Positive (negative) actions in the pre-identifier period 
constitute 54% (46%) of events, and they amount to 46% (54%) in the post-identifier period. 
The average rating is higher in the pre-identifier period, although the sample size for both 
periods is quite balanced, indicating that ratings are less inflated after the regulation. Given 
that the pre-identifier period includes the outbreak of the global financial crisis and the 
                                                 
8 
However, in the post-identifier period, Moody’s and Fitch issue 52% downgrades against 48% upgrades. 
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European sovereign debt crisis, one could anticipate the reverse i.e., ratings to be higher after 
May 2012.
9
 
     Table 2 illustrates statistical properties of three event samples. The variables in the three 
CRAs’ sub-samples have similar distributions (e.g., term to maturity, coupon rate, and 
issuance amount). These commonalities allow easier comparisons of the results in the 
multivariate analysis and support their reliability. The only exception is the number of 
sovereign bonds used for representing a country. S&P has the highest number of 130 bonds 
whereas Moody’s and Fitch are represented by 96 and 92 sovereign bonds respectively. This 
can be justified by the highest number of events being for S&P. With cumulative two-day [0, 
+1] mean yield spread of 0.47, S&P has the lowest value for this variable. S&P’s 
conservatism could explain this phenomenon. According to Flynn and Ghent (2018), S&P 
received the greatest regulatory pressure in the recent years. Descriptive statistics 
representing the variables used in the multivariate analysis are also reported in Table 2. 
     Furthermore, we construct a sample of non-events where each bond on the rating event 
date is matched with a randomly selected non-event date.
10
 The non-event sample comprises 
the same time period but includes only clean observations. These are defined as observations 
where no credit event for that sovereign, by any of the three CRAs, occurred in a window of 
30 days before/after the non-event date. Additionally, there must be no rating change for the 
US by any of the three CRAs within 30 days before/after the non-event date. Finally, the non-
event date must not fall within the window of 30 days before/after the date of the introduction 
of identifier rules (30 April 2012). Additionally, when non-event and event observations are 
being matched in the pre- and post-identifier periods only, the clean observations from the 
relevant period are available for random selection. The total sample comprises 1646 
                                                 
9 
Despite its role in the European debt crisis, Greece does not feature in our sample because it did not issue 
any bonds denominated in US dollars which met our selection criteria. 
10
 If the model was estimated using only event dates, relevant coefficients would be measuring the 
incremental change of rating action exceeding one CCR point in the yield spreads. 
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observations with 692 for S&P, 490 for Moody’s and 464 for Fitch sub-samples 
respectively.
11
 
 
5. Multivariate analysis 
5.1. Main methods  
 In the empirical investigation, we focus solely on the impact of the introduction of 
regulation on the quality of sovereign ratings, not the interaction between changes in 
regulation and competition. Opp et al. (2013) argue that isolating the effect of changes in 
regulation is important. CRA competition plays a central role in rating quality of highly 
competitive non-sovereign rating markets.
12
 However, the role of competition is less 
intensive in our setting, given that the big three CRAs assign the vast majority of sovereign 
ratings.  
 Following the empirical literature (see Section 3), the quality of ratings is captured by the 
information content of ratings (Bae et al., 2015; Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Behr et al., 
2018; Dimitrov et al., 2015). The quality is examined by testing whether the market is more 
aligned with ratings through bond yields before or after the cut-off date. When ratings 
accurately reflect issuers’ creditworthiness and correlate strongly with bond yields, they 
reduce the information asymmetries between investors (and diminish risks for less-informed 
investors), which is indicative of high quality (Abad et al., 2019; Flynn and Ghent, 2018). On 
the other hand, any evidence of a weak correlation between bond yields and ratings suggests 
that ratings perform poorly in terms of information transmission (Becker and Milbourn, 
2011). As suggested by Abad et al. (2019), low quality ratings harm the function of CRAs as 
information gatekeepers and make contracting with ratings more difficult.  
                                                 
11 
The non-event sample for each CRA contains the same number of observations as the event sample.  
12
 For example, increased competition coincides with lower quality (inflated) ratings from incumbents in 
the corporate rating market (Dimitrov et al., 2015) and the structured finance rating market (Flynn and 
Ghent, 2018). 
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 If ESMA’s aims are to be achieved, we hypothesize that the link between rating changes 
and bond yields should strengthen after the introduction of the identifier rules in April 2012. 
According to ESMA (2017b), ratings issued and endorsed in Europe fulfil the equivalence in 
methodology and transparency standards representing their high quality. Therefore, ratings 
should solely reflect factors related to the expected debt servicing by the issuer and correlate 
closely with the bond yields. In addition, this motivates an expectation that the location of 
rating analysts (in the EU or outside the EU) should not have a significant impact on the 
informativeness of sovereign ratings. 
 Because bond prices change far more frequently than ratings, we look at the change in 
informativeness (accuracy) levels rather than absolute match to market measures. 
Specifically, we test whether rating changes are able to explain bond yield changes (decreases 
or increases in bond spreads). This capability differentiates ratings into less or more 
informative. Separate sets of regressions for rating upgrades and downgrades are used due to 
their expected different outcomes, and for each of the three CRAs. We expect unequal effects 
across CRAs to be driven by differences in their methodologies, assumptions and 
performance (Bongaerts et al., 2012; Livingston et al., 2010). The baseline model examines 
our first research question regarding the impact of the identifiers disclosure rule on rating 
quality, as follows: 
𝛥Yield𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝛥Rating𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2Identifier𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝛥Rating*Identifier)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4Rating58𝑖,𝑡 
                                            +𝛽5Maturity𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆1CF + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                 (1a)
                                                                                                                        
∆Yieldi,t is the change in yield spread to the closest maturity US Treasury Bond for country i 
on day t in the time window [0, +1],
 
expressed in basis points.  
∆Rating is the change in sovereign issuer CCR by one of the three CRAs coded as absolute 
ordinal values 1 (1-CCR), 2 (2-CCR) and 3 (>2-CCR) for ease of interpretation, and 0 (no 
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change).
13
 The coefficient β1 resembles the marginal effect on yield spreads as a result of a 
unit change based on the CCR scale (on an event date and zero on a non-event date). 
Following Bae et al. (2015), Becker and Milbourn (2011) and Behr et al. (2018), we use the 
information content of ratings represented by linkages between rating actions and bond yields 
as a measure of rating quality. Positive rating actions should imply decreased risk for 
investors (i.e. narrower spreads), hence we expect a negative sign for the coefficient of 
ΔRating. On the other hand, for the negative events, we expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of ΔRating, as the yield spreads should increase to reflect the underlying risk on 
the bonds. 
The Identifier indicator variable equals 1 after the ESMA endorsement rules took effect on 30 
April 2012, and 0 otherwise.  
ΔRating* Identifier, the key variable in this model, measures the linkage between quality of 
ratings and ESMA’s requirement for identifiers by observing the impact of rating actions 
upon yields in the post-intervention period. The magnitude of rating events’ impact on the 
bond spread in the post-identifier period is calculated by summation of the coefficient values 
of ΔRating*Identifier and ΔRating. In the case of positive rating changes, if the sign is 
negative (corresponding to the expected sign on the ΔRating variable) and significant, 
positive rating events are informative as they are associated with narrowing bond yields in the 
post-identifier period. This corresponds to a high quality of ratings. On the other hand, if the 
interaction produces a positive significant coefficient, positive rating events widen (rather 
than narrow) bond yields in the post-identifier period, implying that ratings are of lower 
quality. Similarly, in the case of negative events, if the interaction has a positive significant 
coefficient, we detect stronger links between rating changes and spreads after the regulation 
was enacted, indicating a higher quality of ratings. Conversely, if the sign is negative, the 
                                                 
13 
We also estimate Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) using a binary variable that equals 1 on the day of a rating event 
and 0 otherwise. The results (available on request) are consistent.  
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negative events are not informative as they narrow (rather than widen) spreads, suggesting 
lower quality of ratings.  
Rating58 represents the sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58 and represents a proxy for the 
macroeconomic conditions of the sovereigns. 
Maturityit is the natural logarithm of the remaining years to maturity of the bond i on the 
event date t. It controls for possible heterogeneity among spread changes which arise due to 
differences in the remaining years to maturity of bonds.    
 
CF is country fixed effects.
14
  
     To examine our second research question, on the impact of rating analysts’ location on 
rating quality, Eq. (1b) is estimated to differentiate between the impact of rating events for 
issuers with EU versus EE identifiers in the post-identifier period in comparison with the 
impact of events in the pre-identifier period. Here, the null hypothesis suggests that ratings 
are of equivalent quality regardless of whether they are issued in the EU or elsewhere. 
Ratings should only reflect factors related to the expected debt servicing by the issuer, 
therefore we expect that the location of rating analysts (in the EU or outside the EU) has an 
insignificant impact on the informativeness of sovereign ratings. Superior quality of ratings 
issued by analysts located in the EU could be explained by the fact that the CRAs in the EU 
are under closer scrutiny in the post-identifier period. On the other hand, superior quality of 
endorsed ratings could stem from the fact that CRA offices in a non-EU country aim to 
establish a strong reputation for rating reliability. We test this using the following 
specification:  
 
Yield𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝛥Rating𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2EE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3EU𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝛥Rating*EE)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝛥Rating*EU)𝑖,𝑡 
                                                 
14
 We also estimate Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) including global time-varying risk factors (e.g. Acharya et al., 
2013; Bedendo et al., 2018; Kahl et al., 2013). In separate estimations, we include one of three risk factors 
to explain the yield spreads: CBOE VIX volatility index, Treasury rate (5 years maturity), and interest rate 
swap spreads (5 years maturity). These results confirm the main findings.  
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                                   +𝛽6Rating58𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7Maturity𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆1CF + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (1b)                            
                         
EE (EU) takes the value of 1 if the rating of sovereign i is EU endorsed (EU originated) in the 
post-identifier period (after 30 April 2012), 0 otherwise. 
ΔRating*EE/EU tests whether any change in rating quality depends on the location of the 
analyst. Here we are testing whether ratings originated outside the EU induce more (less) 
reaction in yield spreads than the ratings issued in the EU. For instance, if the interaction 
ΔRating*EE, tested on the positive events sample, produces a negative significant coefficient, 
this implies a stronger link between bond yields and ratings in the post-identifier period when 
the rating is endorsed (rather than originated in the EU). If the sign is positive and significant, 
the effect between yields and ratings decreased, implying a lower quality of ratings in the 
post-identifier period when the ratings are assigned the EE identifier. The same logic applies 
to negative events, i.e. a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term implies 
that sovereign rating actions assigned by analysts located outside the EU in the post-identifier 
period are of better quality. A negative sign would indicate a weaker link between the spreads 
and ratings in the post-identifier period for ratings issued in a jurisdiction outside the EU.  
 
5.2. Time versus cross-sectional variations 
 In addressing our first research question regarding the impact of the identifiers disclosure 
rule, we conduct further investigations to ensure that some unobserved effects, which could 
be captured by the dummy variable Identifier, do not drive the results. We use two sub-
samples (i) pre-identifier period and (ii) post-identifier period, and compare the statistical 
significance of the variable ΔRating in both periods. The following model is estimated:  
             𝛥Yield𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝛥Rating𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2Rating58𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3Maturity𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆1CF + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (2)                                                  
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 In Eq. (2), following Dimitrov et al. (2015), we examine the informativeness of rating 
news in two periods, before and after the identifiers disclosure rule. When interpreting the 
rating quality, we focus on both the size and significance of the coefficients. If the ΔRating 
coefficient in the post-identifier period is statistically significant and with the expected sign 
(negative for positive events and positive for negative events) and larger in magnitude than 
the ΔRating coefficient in the pre-identifier period, we conclude that the rating news is of 
better quality (i.e. more informative) in the post-identifier period. On the other hand, if the 
ΔRating coefficient in the post-identifier is insignificant or significant with either the opposite 
sign or with the expected sign but with smaller magnitude, then we conclude that ratings 
news in the post-identifier period is of lower quality (i.e. less informative).  
 We further conduct an F-test to compare the coefficients on the ΔRating variable in the 
pre- and post-identifier periods.
15
 This tests the hypothesis that the beta coefficient of 
ΔRating in the pre-identifier sample (β1 (i)) is equal to the beta coefficient of ΔRating in the 
post-identifier period (β1 (ii)). Positive and negative events are tested separately for each of 
the three CRAs. If the new identifiers deliver better rating quality, then absolute values of 
β1(in sample (i) will be smaller than β1 in sample (ii), because rating changes better explain 
the bond yields after the rule was introduced. On the other hand, if the regulation has a weak 
effect (poorer rating quality), then absolute values of β1 in sample (i) will be greater than β1 
in sample (ii).  
 To further investigate our second research question, ruling out any other events coinciding 
with the adoption of the endorsement rules, we disentangle the possible effect that an 
analyst’s location might have on the quality of ratings (via the use of identifiers). We estimate 
Eq. (2) using only the post-identifier period (May 2012-June 2016) with the distinction 
between ratings issued in the EU versus ratings issued in EU-endorsed countries (EE 
                                                 
15 
The test is performed using seemingly unrelated regression, which estimates the simultaneous 
(co)variance of the coefficients of the two equations being compared. 
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identifier). Then, we compare the magnitude of the coefficient of ΔRating in the two sub-
samples (EE versus EU sub-samples) and test the statistical difference between them. The EU 
(EE) sub-sample consists of sovereign rating events for issuers with EU (EE) identifiers. The 
null hypothesis states that ratings issued by analysts in the EU and in the EU-endorsed 
countries in the post-identifier period are of equal quality. If the EU issued ratings are of 
higher quality, we expect the absolute values of β1 (ii) for the EU sub-sample to be greater 
than β1 (ii) in the EE sub-sample, because rating changes are better at explaining bond yields 
when analysts are based in Europe. Superior quality of ratings from analysts within the EU 
could be explained by the fact that the EU has high levels of stringency in regulations and the 
actions of CRAs are directly supervised and overseen by ESMA. Conversely, if EU endorsed 
ratings are of better quality, we would expect the absolute values of β1 (ii) for the EE sub-
sample to be greater than β1 (ii) in the EU sub-sample because there is greater effect of the 
rating news on the spread in the endorsed countries. Superiority of ratings assigned outside 
the EU could stem from the fact that for these ratings to be endorsed, the actions of the third 
country CRAs issuing them need to be overseen by the endorsing CRA rather than ESMA. 
The third country’s CRAs have strong incentives to signal quality and reliability of their 
ratings to maintain their reputation in the EU system and with ESMA.  
 In addition, we further investigate our second research question regarding the impact of 
the rating analysts’ location, ensuring that no other events (time nor cross-section related) 
coincided with the adoption of the disclosure rules. We apply the quasi-experimental design 
of difference-in-differences estimation, where we focus on the differences arising between 
the treatment and control groups, as follows: 
𝛥Yield𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝛥Rating*EEB)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝛥Rating*EUB)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝛥Rating*EE)𝑖,𝑡 + 
                                  𝛽4(𝛥Rating*EU)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5Rating58𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6Maturity𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆1CF + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (3)                                                       
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 EEB (‘EE’ Before) is equal to 1 during the pre-disclosure period for ratings which have 
the ‘EE’ identifier in the post-disclosure period, and 0 otherwise. EUB (‘EU’ Before) is equal 
to 1 during the pre-disclosure period for ratings which have the ‘EU’ identifier in the post-
disclosure period, and 0 otherwise. ‘EE’ and ‘EU’ are defined as in Eq. (1b). We assume that 
the EU jurisdiction is constant (control group), while the treatment group is the endorsed 
group of ratings following from the regulatory action (EE identifiers). We assume that ratings 
which have ‘EU’ identifiers in the post-disclosure period already had ratings issued within 
the EU in the pre-disclosure period. In the difference-in-differences terminology, these 
ratings are not ‘treated’ upon implementation of the identifiers regulation, hence they act as a 
control group. It is then assumed that ratings which have ‘EE’ identifiers in the post-
disclosure period were issued outside the EU in the pre-disclosure period. Upon 
implementation of the identifiers regulation, these ratings are ‘treated’ i.e. become subject to 
endorsement by the EU. In this test, we investigate whether the location of rating analyst 
affected sovereigns (EU originated vs EU endorsed) from both groups to a different extent. 
Specifically, we examine whether EU originated ratings captured via ∆Rating*EU are of 
higher or lower quality than the EU endorsed ratings captured by ∆Rating*EE. We consider 
rating events of higher quality if the interaction is negative (positive) and significant for 
positive (negative) events, and vice versa. 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Main estimation results 
 Table 3 presents the results of Eq. (1a), which examines the first research question, and 
Eq. (1b), which examines the second research question, by each CRA for positive events in 
Panel I and negative events in Panel II. The coefficient on ∆Rating is significant with the 
expected sign for S&P and Moody’s positive events and for S&P and Fitch negative events. 
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This indicates a strong overall link between ratings and bond spreads during the pre-identifier 
period. As expected, the effect of the identifier on the quality of ratings reveals varying 
results across CRAs. Differing market impact by ratings from different CRAs has been found 
in prior literature (e.g. Arezki et al., 2011; Bongaerts et al., 2012: Livingston et al., 2010) and 
relates to the fact that CRAs use different methodologies and assumptions (e.g. Afonso et al., 
2012; Flynn and Ghent, 2018). Additionally, CRAs apply different weights on different 
factors in their rating processes. These differences often lead to differences (in sovereign 
ratings) across CRAs.
16
 The frequency of differences in CRA opinion (split ratings) for 
sovereign debt has increased significantly during and after the global financial crisis. Split 
sovereign ratings for advanced economies are now as common as they once were for 
emerging economies (Amstad and Packer, 2015).  
 Several papers report asymmetric reactions of bond yields and stock market returns to 
negative versus positive rating actions (e.g. Abad et al., 2019; Baum et al., 2016; Kisgen and 
Strahan, 2010). It is argued that rating downgrades provide a greater surprise element in 
comparison to rating upgrades (e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005; Hill et al., 2018). CRAs might 
be less inclined to issue downgrades to sovereigns in fear of losing business within other 
assets classes in that country (Gande and Parsley, 2005). In addition, CRAs may face higher 
penalties for overstating rather understating the creditworthiness of issuers (Goel and Thakor, 
2011), and therefore have stronger incentives to issue more conservative rather than more 
generous ratings in order to protect their reputation (Baghai et al., 2014; Bannier et al., 2010). 
 Regarding our first research question (using Eq. (1a)), Panel I of Table 3 shows poorer 
rating quality (less informative ratings) for positive events by all CRAs in the post-identifier 
period (refer to the interaction term). Conversely, better quality ratings (more informative 
                                                 
16
 Previous literature has found that S&P tends to be the most conservative amongst CRAs and its 
downgrades have stronger effects than those of other CRAs (e.g Flynn and Ghent, 2018). Earlier research 
has also shown that S&P places more weight on rating accuracy whereas Moody’s has a greater emphasis 
on rating stability (e.g. Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009; Kiff et al., 2012).  
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ratings) are reported in Panel II for Moody’s negative events. Regarding our second research 
question (Eq. (1b)), we observe less informative positive events when S&P’s rating analysts 
are located in the EU, and when rating analysts of Moody’s and Fitch are based outside the 
EU. In addition, Fitch negative events are more informative when their rating analysts are 
based outside the EU (i.e. ratings with EE identifiers). 
        The coefficient on ΔRating (Eq. (1a) in Panel I suggests that bond spreads narrow by 
10.26 (3.420*3) basis points on average after S&P issues an upgrade by one notch (3-CCR 
points), implying a strong link between ratings and bond spreads in the pre-identifier period. 
The coefficient on ΔRating*Identifier is positive and significant in the results of Eq. (1a), 
implying a poorer rating quality of S&P upgrades in the post-identifier period. The magnitude 
of rating events’ impact on the bond spread in the post-identifier period is calculated as the 
sum of the coefficient on ΔRating*Identifier and the coefficient on ΔRating. On average, 
bond spreads widen (rather than narrow) by 0.672 basis points [(-3.420 + 3.644) *3] after 
S&P issues an upgrade by one-notch (3-CCR points) after the disclosure rule. In addition, the 
coefficient on ΔRating*EU (in Eq. (1b) in Panel I) is positive and significant, implying that 
S&P’s positive events are less informative when their analysts are located in EU countries. 
The results in Panel II, Eq. (1a), suggest that a one notch downgrade by S&P leads to an 
increase in bond yield spreads by 11.78 (3.926*3) basis points on average. 
     For Moody’s positive rating events (see Panel I of Table 3), the results reveal a strong 
link between ratings and the bond spreads. For instance, in Eq. (1a), an upgrade of one notch 
by Moody’s leads to a narrowing bond spread by 9.678 (3.226*3) basis points. The results 
also indicate poorer quality of positive events by Moody’s (similar to S&P positive events) 
after the introduction of the disclosure rule. This is evident from the positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term (ΔRating*Identifier) in Eq. (1a), suggesting that, on 
average, bond spreads widen by 0.507 [(-3.226+3.395) *3] basis points after Moody’s issues 
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an upgrade by one-notch (3-CCR points) after the disclosure rule. Additionally, the results of 
Eq. (1b) suggest that Moody’s positive events are less informative when their rating analysts 
are located outside the EU (i.e. ratings with EE identifiers). Although the market reaction to 
Moody’s negative events is insignificant in the pre-identifier period (insignificant coefficient 
on ΔRating), their information content increases in the post-identifier period because the 
coefficient on ΔRating*Identifier in Eq. (1a) is positive and significant (Panel II). The 
coefficient signifies that bond spreads widen by 14.775 [(-2.039 + 6.964) *3] basis points on 
average as a result of a rating downgrade by one notch by Moody’s.  
    The market reactions to Fitch’s positive events are insignificant in the pre-identifier 
period (insignificant coefficient on ΔRating), and their information content deteriorates in the 
post-identifier period because the coefficient on ΔRating*Identifier is positive and significant 
(in Eq (1a), Panel I). The coefficient signifies that the bond spreads widen (rather than 
narrow) by 2.445 [(-1.399 + 2.214) *3] basis points on average as a result of a one-notch 
rating upgrade by Fitch. The results of Eq. (1b) in Panel I reveal that Fitch positive events are 
less informative when their analysts are located outside the EU (ratings with EE identifiers) 
in the post-identifier period. Panel II of Table 3 shows that the average bond spread increases 
by 8.31 (2.770*3) basis points following a one-notch downgrade by Fitch (Eq. (1a)) in the 
pre-identifier period. The positive and significant coefficient on ΔRating*EE (Eq. (1b), Panel 
II) suggests that the effect of Fitch negative events on yields in the post-identifier period is 
stronger, thus indicating higher quality, when their rating analysts are located outside the EU 
(i.e. ratings with EE identifiers).  
 
6.2. Time versus cross-sectional variations 
    Tables 4-6 present the results of Eq. (2), which examines our first research question on 
the impact of rating identifiers, tested using (i) pre-identifier and (ii) and post-identifier data 
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samples. This robustness exercise allows us to observe the quality of ratings measured by 
their information content during the pre- and post-identifier periods (similar to Dimitrov et 
al., 2015). A significant (insignificant) coefficient on ∆Rating implies high (poor) quality 
ratings in a given period because we are able to observe the extent to which bond yields 
respond to rating news (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). F-test results reveal statistical 
differences between the ∆Rating coefficients in the pre- and post-identifier sample periods for 
all estimations. The results of Tables 4-6 largely confirm the results from Eq. (1a). 
Specifically, there is a deterioration in rating quality associated with positive news from all 
CRAs after the disclosure rule, while better quality ratings (more informative ratings) for 
Moody’s negative events. In addition, there is some evidence that Fitch (S&P) negative 
events are more (less) informative, i.e. better (lower) rating quality, in the post-identifier than 
in the pre-identifier period. 
 For S&P positive and negative events (Table 4), the coefficient on ∆Rating is significant, 
with the expected sign, in the pre-identifier period only and of much greater magnitude than 
in the post-identifier period (-3.408** vs. 0.253 for positive events; 4.174** vs.1.169 for 
negative events). The F-test confirms that the ∆Rating coefficient is statistically different 
across the two sub-periods (Prob>Chi-squared = 0.038 for positive events and 0.058 for 
negative events). These imply that S&P positive and negative events are less informative 
(lower quality) in the post-identifier versus pre-identifier period. 
 For Moody’s positive events (Table 5), similarly to those of S&P, the coefficient on 
∆Rating is significant with the expected negative sign in the pre-identifier period only, and its 
coefficient’s magnitude is larger than in the post-identifier period (-3.474*** vs. -0.315). The 
F-test confirms that rating quality differs in the periods before and after the disclosure rule 
(Prob> Chi-squared = 0.052). This indicates that Moody’s positive events are less 
informative (lower quality) in the post-identifier than in the pre-identifier period, which is 
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consistent with the relevant result in Table 3 (Eq. (1a)). For Moody’s negative events, 
∆Rating is significant only in the post-identifier period, with the F-test confirming different 
rating quality between these periods. This implies that Moody’s negative events are more 
informative (of better quality) in the post-identifier than pre-identifier period, which is again 
consistent with the result of Table 3 (Eq. 1a). 
 For Fitch positive events, the coefficient on ∆Rating is significant in both time periods, 
with an unexpected positive sign in the post-identifier period, suggesting lower quality of 
Fitch positive events in the post-identifier period (in line with the relevant results in Table 3 
(Eq. (1a)).  For Fitch negative events, the coefficient on ∆Rating is only significant in the 
post- regulatory period with expected positive sign (i.e. wider spread). This indicates some 
evidence that Fitch negative events are more informative (better quality) in the post-identifier 
than in the pre-identifier period. The F-test results in Table 6 confirm that rating quality 
differs in the periods before and after the disclosure rule (Prob> Chi-squared = 0.002 for 
positive events and 0.061 for negative events). 
 To further examine the second research question regarding the impact of rating analysts’ 
location on rating quality, we also estimate Eq. (2) using a sub-sample for the post-identifier 
period for the two groups of countries (EU-originated and EU-endorsed ratings) with the 
results presented in Tables 7-9. The results for news from S&P (Table 7) and Moody’s (Table 
8) are inconsistent with those of Eq. (1b) in Table 3. The coefficient on ∆Rating is 
insignificant for S&P positive events, and with an insignificant F-test result, thereby 
suggesting that the location of S&P analysts (inside or outside the EU) has no significant 
impact on the information content of its positive events. A positive and significant (at the 
10% level) coefficient on ∆Rating for S&P negative events is reported for the EE sub-sample, 
suggesting that this type of news is more informative when S&P analysts are located outside 
the EU. In Table 8, Moody’s positive events are more informative when their rating analysts 
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are located in the EU (the coefficient on ∆Rating has the expected negative sign and is 
significant at the 10% level).
17
  
 On the other hand, the coefficient on ∆Rating is significant (with an unexpected positive 
sign) for Fitch positive events for ratings with EE identifiers (Table 9). This is consistent with 
the findings of Eq. (1b), indicating that these rating events are less informative, and is 
supported by a highly significant F-test result. The magnitude of the ∆Rating coefficient for 
Fitch negative events suggests that they have a stronger impact on widening bond spreads 
when Fitch’s rating analysts are located outside the EU (i.e. ratings with EE identifiers), and 
thus are of better quality than ratings issued by analysts located in the EU (6.092*** for EE 
versus 2.114* for EU). The F-test result confirms that rating quality differs between these 
EE- and EU- sub-samples (Prob> Chi-squared = 0.096).    
    We further investigate our second research question, regarding the impact of the rating 
analysts’ location, by applying the difference-in-differences estimation of Eq. (3). The 
results, reported in Table 10, support the earlier findings based on Eq. (1b). Positive events 
by S&P and Moody’s are less informative (lower quality) in the post-identifier period when 
S&P rating analysts are located inside the EU and when Moody’s rating analysts are located 
outside the EU. This effect is captured by positive and significant coefficients (implying 
wider spreads) on ∆Rating*EU and ∆Rating*EE variables respectively. However, for Fitch, 
the relevant results in Table 10 are insignificant and do not support those of Table 3 (Eq. 
(1b)) and Table 9 (Eq. (2)) which suggest that Fitch positive (negative) events are less (more) 
informative when Fitch rating analysts are located outside the EU.    
 
 
                                                 
17
 There are only 7 negative events by Moody’s in the EU sub-sample in the post-identifier period. The 
results in this case are not reliable and we have not reported the F-test. 
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7. Conclusions     
 This paper presents a unique analysis of the impact of EU endorsement rules on the quality 
of credit ratings. Using a rich dataset of sovereign rating actions from Fitch, Moody’s and 
S&P for 70 countries during the period of 2006-2016, this paper presents the first evidence on 
the influence of ESMA identifiers. We investigate whether rating quality has changed as a 
consequence of the new disclosures, by utilizing the link between rating actions and bond 
yields. We also examine whether the location of rating analysts, inside versus outside the EU 
(i.e. ratings with EU versus EE identifiers), has a significant impact on rating 
informativeness. One key aspect in which this paper differs from studies based on US 
regulation is that it investigates the direct effect of the disclosure rules on rating quality, 
rather than measuring the effect of changing competition amongst CRAs.  
 Our results suggest that the use of endorsement via identifiers does not achieve its 
objective of improved rating quality. In fact, there are cases of significant decreases in quality 
after the disclosure rules were introduced. Poorer (less informative) rating actions are 
reported for positive events by all CRAs after the introduction date. More detailed tests reveal 
some limited evidence that Moody’s and Fitch rating actions are less informative when the 
analysts are based outside the EU. Such inferior rating quality might be a consequence of 
third country CRA offices facing less scrutiny than those in the EU. In contrast, less 
informative positive events by S&P are those with EU identifiers. These findings are 
consistent with Dimitrov et al. (2015) who report that the US Dodd-Frank Act did not result 
in more accurate nor more informative ratings. To some extent, our results also resonate with 
Behr et al.’s (2018) findings that the US CRA regulation (SEC certification) had an adverse 
effect on quality as revealed via ratings inflation.  
 On the other hand, we find evidence of improvements in information content in the cases 
of Moody’s negative rating actions. Additionally, better quality rating downgrade actions are 
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associated with Fitch when their rating analysts are located outside the EU (i.e. with ‘EE’ 
categories). Third country CRA offices seeking to establish a strong reputation for rating 
quality might explain this outcome. This is in line with the improved accuracy of downgrades 
reported by Bedendo et al. (2018) and de Haan (2017) for corporate ratings.  
 ESMA’s identifiers are intended to improve rating quality, yet not to be affected by the 
location of ratings analysts. Our mixed evidence on the impact of rating analysts’ location on 
rating informativeness clearly contributes towards an important stream of literature which 
assesses the effects of regulation on the quality of ratings. There has been no prior evidence 
on this aspect in the context of European CRA regulation. Yet, it deserves further attention 
from both regulators and academic researchers. Further, our findings of differing impact 
across different CRAs and rating events are consistent with the findings of prior literature 
with regard to the varying impact of positive versus negative sovereign rating news on 
financial markets (e.g. Afonso et al., 2012; Baum et al., 2016; Bedendo et al., 2018). 
 Our findings are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions of Opp et al. (2013). These 
authors suggest that the quality of ratings as revealed by information content might improve 
or deteriorate depending on whether there are regulatory gains for the CRA from collecting 
additional information. If the costs of acquiring additional information outweigh its benefits, 
CRAs might decide to inflate ratings instead (e.g., our findings on all CRAs’ positive events). 
They also argue that when regulation promotes highly rated securities, the information 
content of rating actions (rating quality) may change depending on an endogenous threshold 
level of regulatory advantage. When the threshold has been crossed, the CRA no longer 
acquires information and enables regulatory arbitrage by inflating its ratings. Our results 
support the underlying premise of this theory. On the one hand, lower quality of upgrades by 
CRAs might suggest that the regulatory advantage of obtaining more information to issue 
such revisions is outweighed by the costs, and CRAs prefer to inflate the ratings instead. On 
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the other hand, since some negative events signal new and unanticipated information to the 
market and result in stronger market reactions, CRAs may be encouraged by the regulation to 
invest time and resources in ensuring the quality of rating downgrades. 
 ESMA’s endorsement rules and the introduction of identifiers are very specific regulatory 
initiatives and cannot be directly compared to any regulations introduced in the US nor to any 
prior empirical studies. Investigating the influence of these endorsement rules on financial 
markets is of importance to policymakers, governments and market participants alike. 
Endorsement and identifiers could add credibility to CRAs’ decisions, thereby increasing the 
influence of rating actions. This paper’s findings thereby make a unique contribution to the 
policy debate.  
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Table 1. Sovereign credit rating actions by CRAs  
Entire sample S&P Moody's Fitch 
Observations 346  245  232  
Average numerical rating  27.41  28.13  29.07  
Positive events 152 43.93% 141 57.55% 116 50.00% 
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 77 22.25%   74 30.20% 52 22.42% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR point 36 10.41% 41 16.73% 35 15.08% 
Upgrade by > 2 CCR point 39 11.27% 26 10.61% 29 12.50% 
Negative events 194 56.07% 104 42.45% 116 50.00% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 94 27.17% 47 19.18% 57 24.57% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR point 43 12.43% 35 14.29% 22 9.48% 
Downgrade by > 2 CCR point 57 16.47% 22 8.98% 37 15.95% 
Total no of events 346 100.00% 245 100.00% 232 100.00% 
Pre-identifier  
     
Observations 181  121  124  
Average numerical rating  28.27  29.92  30.37  
Positive events 83 45.86% 81 66.94% 64 51.61% 
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 40 22.10% 47 38.84% 29 23.39% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR point 18 9.95% 24 19.84% 21 16.93% 
Upgrade by > 2 CCR point 25 13.81% 10 8.26% 14 11.29% 
Negative events 98 54.14% 40 33.06% 60 48.39% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 45 24.86% 22 18.18% 31 25.00% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR point 22 12.15% 18 14.88% 10 8.06% 
Downgrade by > 2 CCR point 31 17.13% 0 0.00% 19 15.32% 
Total no of events 181 100.00% 121 100.00% 124 100.00% 
Post-identifier 
      
Observations 165  124  108  
Average numerical rating  26.46  26.38  27.58  
Positive events 69 41.82% 60 48.39% 52 48.15% 
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 37 22.42% 27 21.77% 23 21.30% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR point 18 10.91% 17 13.71% 14 12.96% 
Upgrade by > 2 CCR point 14 8.48% 16 12.90% 15 13.89% 
Negative events 96 58.18% 64 51.61% 56 51.85% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 49 29.70% 25 20.16% 26 24.07% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR point 21 12.72% 17 13.71% 12 11.11% 
Downgrade by > 2 CCR point 26 15.76% 22 17.74% 18 16.67% 
Total no of events 165 100.00% 124 100.00% 108 100.00% 
 
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the credit rating dataset, which includes daily 
sovereign rating observations including outlook and watch by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch for 70 
countries for pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier (May 2012-June 2016) periods. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of credit events by CRAs  
Sample S&P Moody's Fitch 
No of countries 66 54 51 
No of sovereign bonds 130 96 92 
No of benchmark bonds 65 56 52 
Mean ∆Yield 0.47 1.68 2.22 
S.D. ∆Yield 23.14 23.36 16.70 
Mean Rating58 (1-58) 27.41 28.13 29.07 
S.D. Rating58 (1-58) 12.06 12.47 11.58 
Mean term to maturity (years) 7.39 6.79 6.98 
S.D. term to maturity (years) 6.49 6.20 5.99 
Mean coupon rate (%) 6.82 6.98 6.78 
S.D. coupon rate (%) 2.30 2.33 2.25 
Mean amount issued (billion USD) 1.19 1.13 1.23 
S.D. amount issued (billion USD) 1.07 1.04 1.05 
Notes. This table presents summary statistics of credit events for each CRA for 70 sovereigns from 
Jan 2006 to June 2016. ∆Yield is the change in yield spread to the closest maturity Treasury Bond in 
the time window [0, +1]. Rating58 represents sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58. Maturity is bond’s 
time to maturity.  
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Table 3. Impact of identifiers on the quality of ratings as measured by bond yields 
Panel I: Positive events 
 
  S&P Moody's Fitch 
VARIABLES Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) 
∆Rating -3.420*** -3.476*** -3.226** -3.232** -1.399 -1.401 
 
(-2.86) (-2.87) (-2.20) (-2.20) (-1.55) (-1.55) 
Identifier -1.674  -1.894  -4.636  
 
(-0.54)  (-0.54)  (-0.92)  
∆Rating* Identifier 3.644**  3.395*  2.214*  
 
(1.99)  (1.65)  (1.67)  
Rating58 0.214 0.250 -0.316 -0.317 -0.446** -0.420* 
 
(0.57) (0.64) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-2.06) (-1.91) 
Maturity -1.501 -1.528 -4.280*** -4.297*** -2.771*** -2.790*** 
 
(-0.90) (-0.91) (-2.79) (-2.78) (-2.76) (-2.77) 
EE  -2.197  -2.673  -5.606 
 
 (-0.53)  (-0.72)  (-0.98) 
EU  -0.855  1.862  -3.664 
 
 (-0.19)  (0.25)  (-0.68) 
∆Rating *EE 3.358  3.995*  3.435** 
 
 (1.42)  (1.82)  (2.04) 
∆Rating *EU  3.993*  1.415  1.171 
   (1.75)  (0.41)  (0.74) 
Observations 304 304 282 282 232 232 
R-squared 0.1047 0.1053 0.1726 0.1750 0.2700 0.2381 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3. Continued.  
Panel II: CRAs negative events 
  S&P Moody's Fitch 
VARIABLES Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) 
∆Rating 3.926*** 3.860*** -2.039 -1.907 2.770** 2.725** 
 
(2.81) (2.76) (-0.57) (-0.53) (2.30) (2.29) 
Identifier 3.903  -2.997  -3.882  
 
(1.01)  (-0.41)  (-1.09)  
∆Rating* Identifier -0.943  6.964*  1.816  
 
(-0.48)  (1.69)  (1.08)  
Rating58 0.684** 0.670** 0.290 0.518 0.023 0.005 
 
(2.09) (2.05) (0.60) (0.97) (0.09) (0.02) 
Maturity -2.361 -2.396 -0.689 -1.051 -3.247* -2.538 
 
(-1.32) (-1.33) (-0.22) (-0.30) (-1.84) (-1.43) 
EE  3.235  -2.399  -2.527 
 
 (0.59)  (-0.32)  (-0.47) 
EU  3.765  9.669  -2.930 
 
 (0.86)  (0.49)  (-0.74) 
∆Rating *EE -0.528  6.639  4.091** 
 
 (-0.21)  (1.58)  (1.99) 
∆Rating *EU  -1.137  8.301  -0.857 
   (-0.48)  (1.02)  (-0.41) 
Observations 388 388 208 208 232 232 
R-squared 0.1326 0.1323 0.2554 0.2604 0.2975 0.3170 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b). The dataset consists of daily positive 
and negative sovereign events by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch based in 58-CCR rating scale for 70 countries during Jan 2006-June 2016. For every event observation there is a 
randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads 
towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. ∆Rating is the change in sovereign issuer CCR by one of the three CRAs coded as 
absolute ordinal values 1 (1-CCR), 2 (2-CCR) and 3 (>2-CCR), and 0 (no change). Identifier dummy equals 1 after the endorsement rules introduced by ESMA took effect on 
April 30 2012, and 0 otherwise. Rating58 represents sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58. Maturity is bond’s time to maturity. EE (EU) takes the value of 1 if the rating of 
sovereign i is EU endorsed (EU originated) in the post-identifier period (30 April 2012), 0 otherwise. Year (country) fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (1a) 
and (1b) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values (Panel I and II) for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Table 4. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients in the pre and post-identifier periods: S&P  
                                              S&P positive events S&P negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 pre-identifier post-identifier pre-identifier post-identifier 
∆Rating -3.408** 0.253 4.174*** 1.169 
 (-2.05) (0.38) (3.31) (1.57) 
Rating58 0.511 0.663* 1.3734*** -0.022 
 (0.64) (1.72) (3.28) (-0.22) 
Maturity 0.701 -1.729 -1.615 -2.015* 
 (0.20) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-1.84) 
     
Observations 166 138 196 192 
R-squared 0.109 0.338 0.169 0.100 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 [pre_mean]∆Rating- [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 [pre_mean]∆Rating - [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
 4.27 0.038 3.59 0.058 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients in two sample periods. The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive 
and negative sovereign events by S&P based on 58-CCR rating scale for 66 countries during pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier (May 
2012-June 2016) periods. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, 
in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day 
t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We 
estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 
10%.  
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Table 5. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients in the pre and post-identifier periods: Moody’s  
                                                   Moody’s positive events Moody’s negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 pre-identifier post-identifier pre-identifier post-identifier 
∆Rating -3.474** -0.315 -3.740 5.553*** 
 (-2.05) (-0.22) (-0.83) (2.72) 
Rating58 -0.234 0.421 -0.064 1.575** 
 (-0.37) (0.55) (-0.22) (2.13) 
Maturity -3.947 -1.145 0.538 -5.376 
 (-1.37) (-0.29) (0.11) (-1.20) 
     
Observations 162 120 80 128 
R-squared 0.196 0.238 0.100 0.225 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 [pre_mean]∆Rating- [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 [pre_mean]∆Rating - [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
 3.78 0.052 3.42 0.064 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients in two sample periods. The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive 
and negative sovereign events by Moody’s based on 58-CCR rating scale for 54 countries during pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier 
(May 2012-June 2016) periods. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which 
measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the 
event day t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). 
We estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% 
and 10%. 
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Table 6. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients in the pre and post-identifier periods: Fitch  
                                            Fitch positive events Fitch negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 pre-identifier post-identifier pre-identifier post-identifier 
∆Rating -1.330*** 0.934** 0.525 3.041*** 
 (-2.63) (2.06) (0.68) (3.60) 
Rating58 0.148 -1.095*** -0.396** 1.623* 
 1.11 (-4.34) (-2.43) (1.89) 
Maturity -0.463 -1.328 1.345 -11.264*** 
 (-0.36) (-0.79) (0.58) (-3.35) 
     
Observations 128 104 120 112 
R-squared 0.135 0.399 0.168 0.459 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 [pre_mean]∆Rating- [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 [pre_mean]∆Rating - [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
 9.40 0.002 3.51 0.061 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients in two sample periods. The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive 
and negative sovereign events by Fitch based on 58-CCR rating scale for 51 countries during pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier (May 
2012-June 2016) periods. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, 
in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day 
t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes). We 
estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 
10%. 
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Table 7. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients by analyst location, May 2012-June 2016: S&P  
                                                S&P positive events S&P negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 EE sub-sample EU sub-sample EE sub-sample EU sub-sample 
∆Rating 0.503 -0.101 5.295* 0.351 
 (1.34) (-0.19) (1.87) (0.40) 
Rating58 0.251** 1.104* 1.342* -2.382* 
 (1.96) (1.76) (1.75) (-1.72) 
Maturity -1.933* -0.237 -8.385*** -2.773 
 (-1.82) (-0.10) (-2.81) (-0.89) 
     
Observations 56 82 84 116 
R-squared 0.331 0.301 0.128 0.378 
country fe Yes yes Yes Yes 
 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating- [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating - [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
   0.83 0.360 2.77 0.095 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients for the two groups of countries (EU vs EU identifier) in the post-
identifier sample period (May 2012-June 2016). The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive and negative sovereign events by S&P based on 58-CCR 
rating scale. EU (EE) sub-sample consists of sovereign rating events with EU (EE) identifiers. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-
event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ 
command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for 
interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Table 8. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients by analyst location, May 2012-June 2016: Moody’s  
                                            Moody’s positive events Moody’s negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 EE sub-sample EU sub-sample EE sub-sample EU sub-sample (
a
) 
∆Rating 0.606 -1.630* 5.607***  
 (0.57) (-1.92) (2.59)  
Rating58 .620 -0.242 1.982*  
 (1.07) (-0.65) (1.65)  
Maturity -5.380 -1.168 -5.818  
 (-0.82) (-1.03) (-1.24)  
     
Observations 90 40 118  
R-squared 0.305 0.417 0.195  
country fe Yes Yes Yes  
 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating- [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0  
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2   
 2.79 0.094   
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients for the two groups of countries (EU vs EU identifier) in the post-
identifier sample period (May 2012-June 2016). The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive and negative sovereign events by Moody’s based on 58-
CCR rating scale. EU (EE) sub-sample consists of sovereign rating events with EU (EE) identifiers. For every event observation there is a randomly selected 
non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards 
the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ 
command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for 
interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
(
a)There are only 7 negative events by Moody’s in the EU post-identifier sub-sample. The results in this case are not reliable and we have not reported the F-
test. 
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Table 9. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients by analyst location, May 2012-June 2016: Fitch  
                                                   Fitch positive events Fitch negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 EE sub-sample EU sub-sample EE sub-sample EU sub-sample 
∆Rating 4.002*** -1.075* 6.092*** 2.114* 
 (3.12) (-1.83) (2.70) (1.72) 
Rating58 -2.099*** 0.271* -0.853 -0.077 
 (-3.41) (1.71) (-0.96) (-0.76) 
Maturity -0.615 -5.948*** -3.919 -0.569 
 (-0.24) (-4.07) (-0.58) (-0.39) 
     
Observations 42 62 52 74 
R-squared 0.555 0.589 0.349 0.128 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating- [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating - [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
 12.92 0.000 2.76 0.096 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients for the two groups of countries (EU vs EU identifier) in the post-
identifier sample period (May 2012-June 2016). The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive and negative sovereign events by Fitch based on 58-CCR 
rating. EU (EE) sub-sample consists of sovereign rating events with EU (EE) identifiers. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event 
observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ 
command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for 
interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (3) using Ordinary Least Squares. The 
credit rating dataset consists of daily positive and negative sovereign events by: S&P, Moody’s and Fitch based on 58-CCR rating scale for 70 countries 
during Jan 2006-June 2016. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which 
measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the 
event day t. EEB (‘EE’ Before) equals to 1 during the pre-identifier period for those countries which have the ‘EE’ identifier in the post-identifier period, and 
0 otherwise. EUB (‘EU’ Before) equals to 1 during the pre-identifier period for those countries which have the ‘EU’ identifier in the post-identifier period, 
and 0 otherwise. EE (EU) takes the value of 1 if the rating of sovereign i is EU endorsed (EU originated) in the post-identifier period (30 April 2012), 0 
otherwise. Rating58 represents sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58. Maturity is bond’s time to maturity. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We 
estimate Eq. (3) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 
10%. 
 
Table 10. Difference-in-Differences estimation: Treatment versus control countries 
VARIABLES S&P + S&P - Moody's + Moody's - Fitch + Fitch - 
       
∆Rating*EUB -9.026*** 1.214 0.528 -3.210 -2.128 2.167* 
 (-2.95) (0.77) (0.12) (-0.43) (-1.09) (1.67) 
∆Rating*EEB -3.297** 0.660 -4.702** -1.182 0.785 7.582*** 
 (-2.14) (0.27) (-2.20) (-0.31) (0.61) (3.16) 
∆Rating*EE 2.722 2.288 5.005** 5.569 0.391 -0.601 
 (1.27) (0.81) (1.98) (1.38) (0.25) (-0.23) 
∆Rating*EU 8.946*** 1.413 -1.058 12.646 1.237 -1.330 
 (2.70) (0.66) (-0.22) (1.49) (0.59) (-0.71) 
Rating58 0.184 0.468 -0.297 0.490 -0.371* 0.060 
 (0.50) (1.63) (-0.91) (1.22) (-1.77) (0.27) 
Maturity -2.131 -2.515 -3.893** -0.250 -2.558** -2.239 
 (-1.27) (-1.39) (-2.50) (-0.08) (-2.55) (-1.30) 
       
Observations 304 388 282 208 232 232 
R-squared 0.1221 0.1134 0.1953 0.2585 0.2353 0.3368 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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    Appendix A: Credit rating scale 
Rating symbols Outlook/Watch  
58-
point  
Adjustments 
58-point CCR 
scale 
AAA/Aaa stable watch/outlook  
 
0 58 
AAA/Aaa negative outlook  58 -1 57 
AAA/Aaa negative watch   -2 56 
AA+/Aa1 positive watch   2 57 
AA+/Aa1 positive outlook   1 56 
AA+/Aa1 stable watch/outlook  55 0 55 
AA+/Aa1 negative outlook   -1 54 
AA+/Aa1 negative watch   -2 53 
AA/Aa2 positive watch   2 54 
AA/Aa2 positive outlook   1 53 
AA/Aa2 stable watch/outlook  52 0 52 
AA/Aa2 negative outlook   -1 51 
AA/Aa2 negative watch   -2 50 
AA-/Aa3 positive watch   2 51 
AA-/Aa3 positive outlook   1 50 
AA-/Aa3 stable watch/outlook  49 0 49 
AA-/Aa3 negative outlook   -1 48 
AA-/Aa3 negative watch   -2 47 
[……] [……]  [……] [……] [……] 
B-/B3 positive watch   2 15 
B-/B3 positive outlook   1 14 
B-/B3 stable watch/outlook  13 0 13 
B-/B3 negative outlook   -1 12 
B-/B3 negative watch   -2 11 
CCC+/Caa1 positive watch   2 12 
CCC+/Caa1 positive outlook   1 11 
CCC+/Caa1 stable watch/outlook  10 0 10 
CCC+/Caa1 negative outlook   -1 9 
CCC+/Caa1 negative watch   -2 8 
CCC/Caa2 positive watch   2 9 
CCC/Caa2 positive outlook   1 8 
CCC/Caa2 stable watch/outlook  7 0 7 
CCC/Caa2 negative outlook   -1 6 
CCC/Caa2 negative watch   -2 5 
CCC-/Caa3 positive watch   2 6 
CCC-/Caa3 positive outlook   1 5 
CCC-/Caa3 stable watch/outlook  4 0 4 
CCC-/Caa3 negative outlook   -1 3 
CCC-/Caa3 negative watch   -2 2 
CC, SD, D/ 
Ca, C/ RD, D 
  1 
 
1 
 This Table presents the transformation of the alphabetical rating scale to the 58-point CCR numerical rating 
scale. 
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1 
 We examine the impact of ESMA credit rating identifiers on the quality of ratings  
 The ESMA requirement for rating identifiers yields varying outcomes 
 The rating quality associated with Moody’s downgrades improves 
 Upgrades by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch are of lower informational value 
 Analyst location does not reveal any consistent effect on changes in rating quality 
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